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Abstract 
This study uses two micro-level datasets to perform an empirical assessment of the 
role of education on the decision to be corrupt. Bribe payments are used as proxy for 
corruption. The results show that increasing the level of schooling increases the propen-
sity to bribe. A model of costs and benefits is assumed and regressions are ran to evalu-
ate the effect of education on an intrinsic and an extrinsic cost of being corrupt, meas-
ured by justifiability of corruption and perception of corruption, respectively. The esti-
mates show education increases one’s intrinsic cost (decreases justifiability) and de-
creases one’s extrinsic cost (increases perception). 
 
Keywords: 
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1. Introduction  
Corruption, here defined as an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit 
that may or may not be deserved in the absence of payoffs (Rose-Ackerman 2009), is a 
serious economic problem in the world. The losses due to corrupt practices, such as 
bribery, theft and tax evasion, are estimated by the World Bank to be equivalent to $1,3 
trillion annually, or the combined size of the economies of Switzerland, South Africa 
and Belgium, according with the outgoing chairman of the Global Organization of 
Parliamentarians Against Corruption (Yamsuan 2013). Evidence as been found that it 
causes lower investment and economic growth (Mauro 1995), less government spending 
on education (Mauro 1997) and fewer efficiency on the allocation of resources (Krueger 
1974). 
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Education, on the other hand, is a major economic goal for the world. Widely 
considered to bear mostly benefits, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, at the individual level 
(earnings) and aggregate level (public good), education is Millennium Development 
Goal number 2. Public funds to support educational efforts have steadily increased all 
over the world and over the centuries, due to the belief that education can be “the Great 
Equalizer”. Political thinkers, such as Rousseau and Jefferson, pioneered this 
philosophical notion in the XVIII century, which emphasized how any person should be 
permitted to rise to the position in society that corresponded to his inborn capacity (Fä-
gerlind 1975). On the topic of corruption, economists have found proof at the macro-
level of a negative correlation between education and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 
1999; Glaeser and Saks 2005). However, the jury is still out on its effect at the individ-
ual level, since the empirical investigation is very scarce.  
So far, empirical research on the determinants of corruption has focused on explain-
ing one type of indicator: aggregate-level perceived corruption. Indeed, most corruption 
indicators (e.g. Transparency International, World Governance Indicators, Business 
International, International Country Risk Guide, among others) are built from the opin-
ions of “experts” such as firm managers, expatriates and country analysts, and com-
pounded for the country. Only recently have the corruption experiences of citizens and 
firms been gathered systematically and analysed quantitatively.  
This study focuses on one main question: what is the role of education in the deci-
sion to be corrupt? To answer this, the direct experiences with bribery of over 40 000 
individuals from 20 African countries were explored, along with the responses of an-
other 40 000 from 87 countries. An analysis based on the costs of bribing was devel-
oped, following Ryvkin and Serra (2012). The main question was then broken down 
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into three: the examination of the impact of schooling on the intrinsic cost of bribery, on 
the extrinsic cost of bribery, and the examination of these in the decision to bribe.  
The results suggest that increasing an individual’s schooling level increases his 
propensity to bribe. The effect seems to come from the decrease of the extrinsic cost 
overriding an increase in the intrinsic cost, though other channels may be at work too, 
such as an increase in one’s benefits, namely monetary benefits. Overall, the findings 
suggest a kind of micro-macro paradox similar to the one found in aid effectiveness, 
since the evidence at the micro-level does not match the findings at the macro-level. 
The contribution of the study is twofold. Besides providing a cross-national micro-
level analysis of several determinants of corruption, with particular emphasis on educa-
tion, it provides an outlook on how corruption varies across services. Health service 
bribes were found to be the least predictable by education, while bribes to the police and 
permit offices are highly correlated with one’s education. This difference could occur 
due to the monopoly power of officials, imperfect recognition by respondents of their 
own bribery behaviour, or if a type of corruption other than bribery is more relevant. 
In what follows, section 2 provides an overview of what the literature has estab-
lished concerning education and corruption. Section 3 frames our theoretical model. 
Section 4 presents the data, while section 5 describes the estimation method. Section 6 
displays and interprets the results. Section 7 offers further comments and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Economists have come to develop a great body of literature on the economics of 
corruption: what causes it, its consequences and measurement. This literature witnessed 
intense growth in the 1990s, when economists turned their closer attention to this matter 
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as the links with the economic performance of countries, namely the recently trans-
formed socialist economies, were becoming noticeable. Until then, it had been subject 
matter mostly for sociologists, political scientists and historians (Abed and Gupta 2002). 
Nowadays, continued interest on the topic and technological improvements in data 
gathering and treatment make way for more empirical literature, to which this study 
contributes. 
The bulk of empirical literature on the determinants of corruption is devoted to the 
analysis of aggregate level data, or macro-level data. This consists on explaining coun-
try-level corruption perception indices, such as those from Transparency International, 
Business International or the International Country Risk Guide, using a set of macro 
regressors, such as average population schooling and measures of institutions. For in-
stance, at this level academics have found corruption to be lower in countries with long 
exposure to democracy, a Protestant tradition or a history of British rule (Treisman 
2000) or where there is higher representation of women in parliament, in senior posi-
tions of government bureaucracy or in the share of labor force (Dollar et al. 2001 and 
Swamy et al. 2011). With what regards education and corruption, the findings point to a 
negative correlation. In 1999, Ades and Di Tella found average years of total schooling 
in the population over 25 years of age had a negative effect on corruption at the 10-per-
cent level. More recently, in 2005, Glaeser and Saks estimated that U.S.A. states with 
higher initial levels of income and education (share of the adult population with 4 or 
more years of college completed) had lower growth in corruption rates (federal corrup-
tion convictions). Moreover, Glaeser and Saks believe the correlation they established 
between economic development and good political outcomes is due to education 
improving political institutions.  
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Despite most theoretical models on corruption having been built upon a microeco-
nomic framework, only recently have empirical studies at the micro-level caught up 
with them. But there are clear advantages of using micro data. For instance, the ability 
to develop profound analysis of the incentives to engage in corruption, which can be the 
basis for better anti-corruption policies, or the disentanglement of certain effects from 
country-specific institutional factors due to within country variation. Most investigation 
turned, so far, to the explanation of corruption among firm managers and civil servants. 
The present study, however, seeks to explain the behaviour of regular citizens. With 
what concerns education and bribes, more educated citizens have been found to both be 
the target of more bride demand, presumably because more educated individuals may 
have more contact with the government (Mocan 2008), and the suppliers of more bribe 
payments, perhaps due to higher opportunity costs for the educated (Guerrero and 
Rodríguez-Oreggia 2008). 
A separate recent strand of literature has been trying to explain the determinants of 
the justifiability of corruption. These studies have either shown a decrease in the per-
ceived reasonableness of someone accepting a bribe if the individual is schooled beyond 
age 16 (Swamy et al 2001) or no correlation at all (Gatti et al. 2003). 
Lastly, another strand of literature deals with the quality and determinants of per-
ceived corruption measures (as opposed to experienced corruption measures). Here, 
education was estimated to be a significant predictor of perceived corruption. In fact, 
conditional on the actual level of corruption, those with a greater level of schooling are 
more likely to report higher perception of corruption – and at a high magnitude too: one 
additional year of schooling means an individual is 5 to 7 percentage points more likely 
to report perception of corruption (Olken 2009). Donchev and Ujhelyi (2013) are cur-
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rently studying the same topic and found so far that one additional level of education 
(primary, secondary or higher) adds around 1 point of perceived corruption in a 12-
point scale. 
 
3. Conceptual framework – A model of bribery 
Following Ryvkin and Serra (2012), take a society where private citizens and pub-
lic officials have the option of engaging in corrupt deals. Suppose these deals involve 
the payment of a bribe by the citizen in exchange for the provision of an illegal service, 
for instance the facilitation of a permit or annulment of a fine. In order to decide the 
amount b the service is worth, the citizen and the official will place sealed bids 
(𝑏!   and  𝑏!) in a traditional double auction with one seller (the official) and one buyer 
(the citizen). If they can meet in a range of bribe values, simultaneously not too low for 
the official and not too high for the citizen, negotiation will take place. This negotiation 
will depend on the relative bargaining power k of each party, such that the final bribe b 
will be an average of both bids weighted by k: 𝑏 = 𝑘𝑏! + 1− 𝑘 𝑏! ,  with  0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 1. 
Most importantly, bids depend on the independent private valuation the individual 
makes regarding its own costs and benefits. Benefits are assumed to be the monetary 
advantage the individual gets from the service (y). Costs on the other hand are com-
prised of two elements: an intrinsic moral cost that the individual may suffer from its 
corrupt actions and an extrinsic cost equal to the anticipated cost from formal or infor-
mal punishments. The latter involves a crucial assumption: the probability of punish-
ment is subject to strategic complementarities, i.e., the fewer people there are acting 
corruptly, the higher is the likelihood of being caught and sanctioned. Three main rea-
sons support this argument: the costs of searching for a corrupt partner are higher, the 
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probability of being audited and detected is higher and the probability of being fined 
once detected is also higher, since that situation may be more difficult to solve with a 
bribe. In other words, extrinsic costs are determined endogenously by the total propor-
tion of corrupt deals. Formally, total cost of corruption for agent i is then defined as: 
𝑐! 𝑥 = 𝑎! + 𝑟  (1− 𝑥), where 𝑎! is the moral intrinsic cost, x is the proportion of cor-
rupt citizen-official pairs (0 < 𝑥 < 1), and 𝑟  (1− 𝑥) is the expected monetary cost of 
the sanctions. Note that corruption is costly for any individual, unless he is intrinsically 
corrupt (𝑎! = 0) and there are no honest citizens and officials (𝑥 = 1). It follows that 
the citizen’s private valuation 𝑣! will be 𝑣! = 𝑦 − 𝑎! − 𝑟  (1− 𝑥).  
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the role of education in determining 
the decision to engage in corruption, we will focus on the private citizen’s valuation, 
rather than on the official’s. We refer the reader to Ryvkin and Serra for more details. 
With this simple yet powerful framework in place, we turn to the empirical estimation. 
 
4. Data 
4.1  Afrobarometer Surveys 
To model the propensity to bribe and the extrinsic cost of bribing we used the 
Afrobarometer Surveys. The Afrobarometer surveys are extensive cross-country sur-
veys that gather information on political, social and economic affairs in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  We use repeated cross-section questionnaires of 20 countries1 from the 2004, 
2005 and 2008 merged rounds of questionnaires, totalling 77 411 observations. The sur-
veys’ respondents form a representative sample of the adult population in each country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 	  Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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The measure of corruption experience is based on the responses to the question: “In 
the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour 
to government officials in order to: Get a document or a permit/Get a child into 
school/Get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone)2/ Cross a border 
(like a customs or immigration post)/Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a 
checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)/Get medicine or medical attention/Anything 
else?” The responses are 0=Never, 1=Once or Twice, 2=A Few Times, 3=Often, and 
include Don’t Know, Refused to Answer, and Missing. 
For all rounds, the following question is also available for five of the seven catego-
ries mentioned above: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Government offi-
cials/Teachers and school administrators/Border officials (e.g., customs and immigra-
tion)/Police/Health workers?” Answers can be 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of 
them, 3=All of them, Don’t Know, Refused to Answer, Missing. This question is here 
taken as the measure for the extrinsic cost of bribing, since, as explained in section 3, 
the (perceived) level of corruption in society (corrupt pairs) helps determine the deci-
sion to engage in or abstain from corruption. 
Finally, the Afrobarometer surveys include individual characteristics of the 
respondents such as age, gender, employment status, living conditions, occupation, and 
religion, which will be used in the regressions below. Responses “don’t know”, “refused 
to answer”, “did not experience this in past year” and missing values were omitted from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This variable aggregates two similar yet slightly different questions: “Get a household 
service (like piped water, electricity, or phone)” (asked in round 2 and 3) and “Get 
water or sanitation services” (asked in round 4). 
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all estimations. The occupation and religion variables were recoded to have a smaller 
number of categories (see appendix 3). 
 
4.2 World Values Surveys 
To find a measure that reflects the intrinsic cost of bribing we turned to the World 
Values Surveys (WVS). These were compiled by the World Values Survey Association, 
a non-profit organization based in Sweden, composed of a worldwide network of social 
scientists. The purpose of their work is to collect information on the values and attitudes 
of people across the globe. An effort was made to have nationally representative sam-
ples in each country. We will make use of 5 waves of aggregated data covering the pe-
riod from 1981 to 2007 and 87 countries3 from all continents. Besides hundreds of other 
topics, the surveys ask respondents about their religion and morale, namely on how 
justified they think certain social behaviours are. Our question of interest is on the 
justifiability of bribery and reads: “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, 
using this card: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties”. It presents a 
scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable), as well as Don´t know, No 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Armenia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan, 
Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Puerto Rico, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Vietnam, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Macedonia, Egypt, Great Britain, 
Tanzania, United States, Burkina Faso, Uruguay, Venezuela, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Zambia, and Serbia. 
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answer, Not applicable, Not asked in survey and Missing/Unknown. This question is a 
proxy for the individual’s intrinsic cost of bribing. 
Lastly, the WVS surveys include the same individual characteristics as the 
Afrobarometer surveys (age, gender, employment status, living conditions, occupation, 
religion), which will be used to explain corruption justifiability below. Responses 
“don’t know”, “not asked in survey”, “not applicable”, “no answer” and “missing” were 
not considered for estimations. Employment status, occupation and religion were re-
coded to have a fewer number of categories (see appendix 3). 
 
4.3 Other data 
Information on the origin of legal systems draws from La Porta et al.’s (1999) da-
taset for “The Quality of Government”. Data on the level of democracy for each country 
varies by year and ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). It 
comes from “Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets”, a 
database put together by researchers from the Centre for Systematic Peace on the basis 
of an assessment of each country’s elections on the grounds of competitiveness, open-
ness and level of participation. Data on GDP per capita at PPP 2005 constant prices was 
gathered from Penn World Tables. Moreover, information on exports as a percentage of 
GDP comes from the World Bank Development Indicators. Last but not least, in one 
model specification, an index was used to control for country-level corruption – the 
Control of Corruption Indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Pro-
ject. This indicator is meant to quantitatively measure the level to which public powers 
are used for personal profit, both at a micro level (petty corruption) and macro level 
(grand corruption and “capture” of the state by elites and lobbies). It is built upon the 
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opinions of citizens, companies and experts from private, public and NGO sectors over 
the quality of governance, and compiled from a great number of sources, including sur-
veys of households and firms (such as the Afrobarometer surveys), NGOs, commercial 
business information providers, and public sector organizations. We refer the reader to 
Kauffman (2011) for more details.  
 
5. Estimation strategy  
The discussion in Section 3 suggests there are at least three possible channels of 
influence regarding a person’s decision to engage in bribery. The first channel is 
through the perception of surrounding corruption. The more people are engaged in it, 
the lower are the briber’s costs of searching and expected cost of sanctions, and so the 
lower is the extrinsic cost and greater the propensity to perform bribery. A second chan-
nel of influence regards the individual’s moral cost from acting corruptly. The more 
tolerable to bribery, the lower his intrinsic moral cost and again the greater the propen-
sity to undergo bribery. Lastly, an influence on the choice to bribe or not is certainly the 
benefits coming from such decision. 
One can think that education affects all three channels. Indeed, it is possible that it 
changes an individual’s perception of corruption. It can also change the desirability of 
corruption, if more educated people are more aware of their rights and their role as citi-
zens or have higher earning capacity. Lastly, education can influence someone’s deci-
sion to engage in bribery by changing his benefits, specifically the monetary rewards. 
Thus, the estimation strategy consists on the following: the main question of inter-
est is in defining the role of an individual’s education in his decision to engage or ab-
stain from bribery. In order to model that, and in light of our theoretical model, we will 
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first evaluate the role of education in determining the perception of corruption (extrinsic 
cost). Then, the same will be done for the inner desirability of corruption (intrinsic 
cost). Finally, we will observe the impact of education on the decision to pay a bribe. 
Overall, three estimations must occur: 
𝐶𝑂𝑅!" = 𝑓(𝑋!" ,𝐶!) 
𝑃𝐸𝑅!" = 𝑓(𝑋!" ,𝐶!) 
𝐽𝑈𝑆𝑇!" = 𝑓(𝑋!" ,𝐶!) 
Where CORij is corruption experience of the ith individual in country j, PERij de-
picts perception of corruption, JUSTij represents inner desirability or justifiability of 
corruption for the individual, Xij outlines the personal characteristics of the individual 
and Cj represents characteristics of country j. Measures for Xij and Cj, are proposed be-
low, following the suggestions of the literature. 
 
5.1.  Individual explanatory variables 
The propensity to pay a bribe is assumed to depend on the respondent’s: education 
level, age, gender, employment status, present living conditions or income, occupational 
sector (primary, secondary, tertiary or inactive) and religion. Young, educated, em-
ployed individuals may be better at recognizing opportunities for corruption. More edu-
cated persons might also have better knowledge about corruption, since they may be 
more aware of the actions of government and hence be better equipped to analyse the 
degree of corruption. Males, on the other hand, are expected to engage more frequently 
in bribing, since in most countries and particularly in developing economies they dis-
play higher labour participation rates and because they have a greater tolerance for ille-
gal activity (Swamy et al. 2001). Lastly, persons working in a given economic sector 
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may be more at hazard of being confronted with a bribery situation, while those who 
profess certain religions may have a belief system more (or less) compatible with brib-
ery. 
The outcomes on perception of corruption and justifiability of corruption are ex-
plained with the same set of demographic characteristics. 
 
5.2.  Country explanatory variables 
Besides individual-specific factors, it is likely that peoples’ thoughts regarding 
bribery are affected by macroeconomic circumstances. For these macro-level determi-
nants of corruption, we turn to two extensive studies on the topic. Treisman (2000) 
compiles a good overview of many current theories on the determinants of corruption. 
Among other aspects, Treisman points out that corruption is expected to be lower, for 
instance, in countries with a particular preoccupation for the procedural aspects of the 
law and property rights, a trademark value of the British legal system. Hence, dummy 
variables were added for British, French, Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal sys-
tem origins. Moreover, rich, democratic countries are expected to have lower levels of 
corruption. Therefore, the level of democracy and a measure of economic development 
(GDP per capita) is added to the model. Ades and Di Tella (1999) advocate that in 
countries endowed with sizeable amounts of natural resources there is greater oppor-
tunity for rent-seeking behaviour by corrupt officials who allocate the rights to such re-
sources. Therefore, the model controls for exports as a percentage of GDP. All out-
comes are explained with the help of these country characteristics. 
 
6. Results 
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There are two samples for this exercise. Tables 1 and 2 in appendix 1 provide the 
definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables, as well as their sources. The high-
est mean frequency of bribes occurs in the medical sector, to obtain medicines or medi-
cal attention (0.28 from 0 to 3), while the lowest mean frequencies are payments to 
cross a border (0.14) and for ‘anything else’ (0.04). The mean responses regarding 
“perception of corruption” indicate the groups most perceived to be involved in corrup-
tion are: police (mean 1.62 in a scale from 0 to 3), border officials (1.59), government 
officials (1.4), health workers (1.04) and school workers (0.93). Lastly, the average 
respondent of the WVS felt corruption is not justifiable (mean 1.77 in a scale from 
1=never justifiable to 10=always justifiable). The mean level of schooling is 3.1 in a 
scale from 0 to 9 in the Afrobarometer surveys and 4,4 in the WVS in a scale from 1 to 
8. 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 assess the direct role of education on bribe propensity. Tables 6 
and 7 examine the extrinsic cost. Finally, table 8 presents the specifications for the 
intrinsic cost. Though all dependent variables are ordinal categorical, Ordinary Least 
Squares estimation was chosen for simplicity. However, Probit and Ordered Probit 
models are also estimated for robustness. As it turns out, the estimation method does not 
change the majority of coefficient signs or their statistical significance, including for 
education. 
 
A. Bribery and education 
Table 3 explains the great decision: to bribe or not to bribe – and if so, how fre-
quently. The dependent variable is payment of bribes as described in section 4. Again, 
the first column presents the benchmark model, while the second omits the occupation 
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dummies and the third omits the country dummies. The final two columns present esti-
mates of the first specification using Probit and Ordered Probit models. In order to 
check the robustness of the previous results, table 4 reproduces the first model of table 3 
for other types of bribery, namely regarding schools, household services, borders, the 
police, health workers and a broad category named “anything else”. The interpretation 
of the latter category is not straightforward, but it is possible that some respondents 
might have felt more at ease not naming exactly where their corruption experience oc-
curred. Table 5 complements table 4 by displaying regressions that include, where 
possible, the extrinsic cost as a predictor variable, in order to assess the influence com-
ing directly from this channel on the decision to be corrupt.  
The results reported in table 3 show that individuals with some level of education, 
as opposed to none, are more likely to have paid bribes for documents or permits. This 
result is robust across estimation methods. The magnitude of the effect seems to be 
greater the higher the level of education. According to the Probit results, individuals 
with the highest level of education (post-graduates) are about 14.5 percentage points 
more likely to have paid a bribe, while individuals with the lowest level of education 
(informal schooling) are only 4.4 percentage points more likely of the same. Removing 
the occupation dummies and country dummies did not improve the goodness of fit of 
the model and it did not change the sign of any coefficient. As for other significant 
regressors, being a female is estimated to decrease the likelihood of having paid a bribe, 
as does living in better conditions. Being employed, working on the secondary or ter-
tiary sectors, or living in a democracy all increase significantly the chance of paying 
bribes. Having a British originated legal system has opposing effects. 
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The results from table 4 confirm the above findings, while showing how they vary 
across different sectors. The pattern of positive significant education coefficients 
increasing in magnitude with the level of education of the individual, seen above in 
corruption regarding documents, is also observed in illicit payments to policemen, bor-
der officials, household service providers and school workers. However, many coeffi-
cients lose significance once the extrinsic cost (perception of corruption) is added as a 
regressor in table 5. This might be an indication of the strength of this channel, as will 
be discussed in the following section. In the medical sector, though, education coeffi-
cients are either not significant or significant and negative, contrary to our general find-
ing. Particularly, having informal schooling as opposed to no schooling seems to de-
crease the frequency of bribe payments to a health worker by 1 to 1.25 percent. Other 
types of corruption (the last column specification) are not well explained by our regres-
sors, apart from religion and some macroeconomic indicators, possibly due to this being 
a mixed category. As for the explanatory variables, age and GDP per capita continue to 
have an insignificant effect on corrupt behaviour. Being a woman significantly reduces 
the frequency of bribes (between -0.25 percent and -2 percent), as do better living 
conditions. The remaining macro indicators (legal system, democracy and exports) have 
conflicting coefficients signs. Finally, a one unit increase in the perception of corrup-
tion, i.e. a decrease in the extrinsic cost, has a highly significant positive influence on 
bribe frequency, between 1.25 percent to 4.5 percent (table 8). 
 
B. Extrinsic cost (perception of corruption) 
In table 6 the dependent variable is perception of corruption as defined in section 4, 
i.e., the amount of corruption each individual thinks or knows there is in the country. In 
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particular, the question chosen was the perception of corruption among government 
officials, to proxy for corruption in the obtainment of documents or permits. The same 
set of regressors as before was used. However, a control of “real” (as opposed to per-
ceived) corruption was added in column 2, named nation corruption. This was done to 
assess the respondent’s perceptions of corruption, holding his probable experience con-
stant. It was represented by a country-level corruption index called the Worldwide 
Governance Indicator Control of Corruption Indicator (see section 4.3). Controlling for 
the nation’s corruption level did not increase the goodness of fit of the model nor 
changed any coefficient on individual characteristics, in OLS, Probit or Ordered Probit, 
so it was not added in the model of table 7. Column 3 estimates the first specification 
without controlling for occupation with the purpose of using more observations (an ex-
tra 22 884), since the fourth round of surveys did not include this question. Column 4 
tests once more the benchmark model without country dummies. Finally, the last two 
columns estimate the same model by Probit and Ordered Probit. As before, a binary 
variable was computed by merging categories from the dependent variable (Percep-
tion_gov01). To check the robustness of the previous findings, measures of different 
types of corruption experience are presented. Table 7 presents the first column from ta-
ble 6 which explains corruption perceptions about government officials, and perceptions 
regarding teachers and school administrators, border officials, police officials and health 
workers (the survey does not include data for household service providers and ‘anything 
else’). 
The results reported in the first column of table 6 indicate that having an education 
increases the perception of corruption among government officials for individuals with 
some secondary schooling or above. This effect increases as the level of education in-
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creases. Probit marginal effects point to an increase in the probability of perceiving 
corruption as high as 14.12 percentage points for respondents with university degrees. 
As regards the other individual characteristics, age displays a small negative effect, 
women report less corruption, being employed or inactive (unemployed, housewife, stu-
dent, retired, disabled, never had a job) has no statistical effect, but if one has a job then 
working in the secondary or tertiary sectors increases the feeling of corruption. 
Additionally, better living conditions decrease perception. As for macro indicators, 
GDP per capita has a null effect, a higher share of exports increases the respondents’ 
perception of corruption and stronger democracies decrease it. The country-level 
corruption index (WGI) is in line with the respondents opinions, since a 1-unit index 
increase (an improvement in the control of corruption) is associated with a 0.33 de-
crease in perceived corruption, in a scale from 0 to 3 (or -8.25 percent).  
This picture hardly changes in table 7 for other types of bribery. Corrupt behaviour 
involving teachers and school administrators, border officials and police is more per-
ceived if the person as some secondary school education or higher. The magnitude of 
change in the answer peaks for university students or graduates. Yet, perceived bribery 
in the health sector is not significantly explained by education, apart from a positive ef-
fect for people with post-secondary qualifications or some university education. The 
previous analysis for age, gender, employment status, living conditions and occupation 
holds. Exports and level of democracy present conflicting signs. 
 
C. Intrinsic cost (justifiability of corruption) 
Last but not least, table 8 presents the dependent variable justifiability of corruption 
as defined in section 4. This question dealt with the respondent’s opinion about some-
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one accepting a bribe. In our theoretical framework, each player’s intrinsic cost is ran-
domly assigned by nature, which moves first in the game. However, we will assume a 
full set of individual and country regressors to explain it. The first specification includes 
year dummy variables to account for macroeconomic shocks that may have affected all 
variables, and country dummies to control for unobserved characteristics that may vary 
between countries. Country-clustered standard errors are computed assuming the fact 
that some variables vary at the country-level, despite the unit of observation being each 
individual. The first column depicts the coefficients and clustered standard errors of a 
model with our benchmark specification. The second column displays the same model 
but not controlling for country-specific effects. Lastly, the third and fourth columns test 
the benchmark model with Probit and Ordered Probit estimation, where marginal effects 
and clustered standard errors are presented. Naturally, to use the Probit method the 
dependent categorical variable was collapsed into a binary variable (justifiable01). 
The results reported in table 8 demonstrate that having at least a complete elemen-
tary education contributes to decreasing a person’s justifiability of corruption, i.e. 
increasing the moral intrinsic cost. The effect is significant at a 1 percent and 5 percent 
significance levels, across estimation methods, and it is higher for the highest levels of 
education, secondary school and university, reaching a probability of finding corruption 
‘never justifiable’ as high as 6.6 percentage points, for people with some university 
training. Age tends to decrease the desirability of corruption, as does being a female, a 
housewife (as opposed to being employed full-time) and having medium income (but 
not high). On the other hand, unemployment seems to increase the legitimacy of bribery 
to the individual’s eyes. As for country characteristics, GDP per capita has no effect, an 
increase in exports decreases justifiability, living in a country with a Socialist (in 
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comparison to a British or Scandinavian) legal system is estimated to increase one’s 
justifiability of bribery, while a Germanic legal system does the opposite. The results of 
the impact of personal characteristics without controlling for country specific effects are 
very similar to those reported in the benchmark regression. 
 
7. Interpretation of findings and concluding remarks 
This study uses two microlevel datasets to examine the impact of education on 
one’s propensity to be corrupt, which is defined as having offered a bribe, a gift or a fa-
vour to government officials, in order to obtain a document or a permit, a child into 
school, a household service (such as water, electricity or telephone), medicines or medi-
cal attention, to cross a border, or to avoid a problem with the police. In order to per-
form this assessment, the theoretical framework of Ryvkin and Serra (2012) was used 
which pointed to two questions: how does one’s decision to bribe depend on an intrinsic 
and an extrinsic cost? The proxy for the former was the respondent’s justifiability of 
corruption, while the latter was measured using people’s perceptions of corruption 
about government workers, teachers, border officials, policemen and health workers. 
The datasets used feature surveys of 257 597 respondents from 87 countries and 77 411 
respondents from 20 African countries. 
Our framework theory suggests that lower costs of bribing should increase bribery 
and indeed such an argument is supported by the results. Firstly, our estimates point to 
an increase in schooling having a mixed effect, simultaneously increasing the intrinsic 
cost and decreasing the extrinsic cost. However, the estimates also indicate that more 
education leads to more bribery. Furthermore, though education may be channelling 
benefits or other types of costs, we observe that including the extrinsic cost in our 
	   22 
regression decreases the significance of education as a predictor for bribery across sec-
tors. This indicates us that the direct channel of effects of education was weakened. 
Thus, it seems one’s intrinsic cost is overshadowed by the extrinsic cost. Overall, the 
findings suggest a sort of micro-macro paradox, similar to the one found in aid 
effectiveness. Briefly, this paradox consists on the finding that aid-effectiveness is high 
at the project level, but low at the macro level (Mosley 1986). In our case, at the macro-
level there is evidence of negative correlation between education and corruption, but at 
the individual-level we find the opposite. At this point, a caveat must be made, since the 
bulk of findings was derived from a dataset containing data for developing countries. It 
is possible that the estimated effects of education differ in developed countries, as 
Mocan (2008) observed. 
Finally, the cross-sector variation of outcomes provides one further insight. The 
estimates show that education is not a good predictor of the likelihood of bribing health 
workers (if anything it has a negative impact) and to some extent school workers. One 
way to explain this would be to think of the discretionary power of the officials in each 
sector. Permits, border passes and police tickets are all supplied exclusively by the 
Government. There is no private sector provision of these goods. Household services 
such as water and electricity are also in most countries provided by publicly owned 
companies. Health services and schools, on the other hand, usually have private sector 
counterparts. So it is possible that more educated individuals steer away from corruption 
(corrupt medical centres in this case) where they can. Another possibility is that 
respondents do not recognize bribery in health services or schools as such (and prefer to 
think of it in some other way) or perhaps there is a type of corruption other than bribery 
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at play4. 
Further research in this topic could investigate the missing link in this story: how 
education changes one’s benefits from corruption. It could examine as well the presence 
of other types of costs. Further investigation could also gather micro-level data that ena-
bles direct comparison of the extrinsic and intrinsic costs, since for the purpose of this 
research these were drawn from two different datasets. 
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Appendix 1 – Regression outputs 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics – Afrobarometer Survey 
Variable name Definition Source Observations Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Individual characteristics 
Bribe_document In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do 
a favour to government officials in order to: [0=Never, 1=Once or Twice, 2=A 
Few Times, 3=Often] Get a document or a permit?  
A 63508 0,2672 (0,6723) 
Bribe_school Get a child into school? A 42578 0,1513 (0,5177) 
Bribe_household 
services 
Get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone)? A 61617 0,1763 (0,5784) 
Bribe_border Cross a border A 21324 0,1438 (0,5437) 
Bribe_police Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or 
arrest)? 
A 63015 0,2604 (0,7024) 
Bribe_health Get medicine or medical attention? A 20549 0,2752 (0,688) 
Bribe_any Anything else? A 22390 0,0359 (0,2595) 
Perception_gov How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to say: [0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most 
of them, 3=All of them] Government officials?  
A 43491 1,4008 (0,8187) 
Perception_school Teachers and school administrators? A 42305 0,9316 (0,8204) 
Perception_border Border officials (e.g., customs and immigration)? A 18085 1,5909 (0,9097) 
Perception_police Police? A 67430 1,621 (0,9085) 
Perception_health Health workers? A 21639 1,0353 (0,8574) 
Bribe_document01 Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answered 1, 2 or 3 in bribe_document. A 63508 0,1675 (0,3734) 
Perception_gov01 Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answered 1, 2 or 3 in perception_gov. A 43491 0,8907 (0,312) 
Education What is the highest level of education you have completed?  No formal schooling 
(value 0), Informal schooling (including Koranic schooling) (1), Some primary 
schooling (2), Primary school completed (3), Some secondary school/ High school 
(4), Secondary school completed/High school (5), Post-secondary qualifications 
other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a technical/polytechnic/college 
(6), Some university (7), University completed (8), Post-graduate (9). 
A 77203 3,1399 (2,0064) 
Age Years of age of the respondent A 76155 36,4179 (14,6906) 
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Female Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is female. A 77411 1,5 (0,5) 
Employment Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are 
you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)? Recoded: 
Unemployed (value 1), part-time employed (2), full-time employed (3). 
A 77053 0,564 (0,8191) 
Income In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions? 1=Very 
bad to 5=Very good. 
A 77068 2,6373 (1,1769) 
Occupation What is your main occupation? If unemployed, retired, or disabled, what was your 
last main occupation? Recoded: Primary sector (value 1), secondary sector (2), 
tertiary sector (3), inactive population (4). 
A 48963 2,4417 (1,2448) 
Religion What is your religion, if any? Recoded question: None (value 0), Muslim (1), 
Christian – catholic (2), Christian – protestant (3), Christian – other (4),  Dutch 
reformed church (5), Traditional (6), Hindu (7), agnostic (8), atheist (9), Jehovah’s 
witness (10), other (11). 
A 77020 2,6999 (1,9945) 
Country characteristics 
British legal origin Respondent country’s legal system origin: British (otherwise French). B 77411 1,7256 (0,4462) 
GDPpc PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series) at 2005 constant prices. C 77411 2291,673 (2531,137) 
Exports Exports of goods and services in percentage of GDP. D 77411 32,1314 (10,6108) 
Democracy Combined Polity Score – ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic). 
E 77411 4,655 (4,2515) 
Nation corruption Worldwide Governance Indicator – Control of Corruption. Ranges from 
approximately -2,5 (weak) to 2,5 (strong) performance. 
F 77411 -0,3641 (0,605) 
Country dummies Country where the respondent took the survey (20 countries). A 77411 11,6446 (5,5718) 
Round Year the respondent took the survey: 2004 (value 2), 2005 (3), 2008 (4). A 77411 3,0441 (0,8185) 
The descriptive statistics pertain to a maximum of 77 411 observations. A: Afrobarometer Round II, III and IV, 16- 18- and 20-country merged datasets. B:  La 
Porta et al., "The Quality of Government", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, April 1999. C:  Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 7.1, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, July 2012. D:  World 
Development Indicators, The World Bank. Accessed in 26/04/2013. E:  Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2011. Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011. Version p4v2011 [Computer File]. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 
University of Maryland. F:  Worldwide Governance Indicators. Accessed in 11/04/2013. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics – World Values Survey 
Variable name Definition Source Observations Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Individual characteristics 
Justifiable Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card: 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (1= Never justifiable to 
10=Always justifiable) 
G 243824 1,7729 (1,7929) 
Justifiable01 Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent’s answer to justifiable is between 6 and 
10 inclusive (=0 otherwise). 
G 243824 0,0552 (0,2283) 
Education What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  Inadequately 
completed elementary education (value 1), completed (compulsory) elementary 
education (2), incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational 
type/(compulsory) elementary education or basic vocational qualification (3), 
complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/secondary, intermediate 
vocational qualification (4), incomplete secondary: university-preparatory 
type/secondary, intermediate general qualification (5), complete secondary: 
university-preparatory type/full secondary, maturity level certificate (6),  some 
university without degree/higher education - lower-level tertiary certificate (7),  
university with degree/higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate (8). 
G 230283 4,4076 (2,3346) 
Age Years of age of the respondent G 247978 40,3126 (15,9141) 
Female Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is female. G 252941 1,5155 (0,4998) 
Employment Are you employed now or not? If yes: About how many hours a week? If more 
than one job: only for the main job. Full time (value 1), part time (2), self-
employed (3), retired (4), housewife (5), students (6), unemployed (7), other 
(8). 
G 246625 3,3531 (2,1941) 
Income Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your 
household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that 
come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes 
and other deductions. Low (value 1), medium (2), high (3). 
G 52060 1,9364 (0,7889) 
Occupation In which profession/occupation do you or did you work? If more than one job, 
the main job? What is/was your job there? Recoded: Primary sector (value 1), 
secondary sector (2), tertiary sector (3), inactive population (4). 
G 200507 2,547 (0,9879) 




Recoded question: None (value 0), Muslim (1), Christian – catholic (2), 
Christian – protestant (3), Christian – other (4), Buddhist (5), Traditional (6), 
Hindu (7), agnostic (8), atheist (9), Jehovah’s witness (10), other (11). 
Country characteristics 
Legal origin Respondent country’s legal system origin: British (value 1), French (2), 
Socialist (3), Germanic (4), or Scandinavian (5).  
B 252597 2,218 (1,0062) 
GDPpc PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series) at 2005 constant prices. C 248914 11698,61 (11460,18) 
Exports Exports of goods and services in percentage of GDP. D 239911 32,406 (23,9008) 
Democracy Combined Polity Score – ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic). 
E 244092 4,9322 (5,6302) 
Country dummies Country where the respondent took the survey (87 countries). G 257597 462,9702 (266,7871) 
Year dummies Year the respondent took the survey: 1981, 1982, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008. 
G 257597 1999,414 (6,35) 
The descriptive statistics pertain to a maximum of 257 597 observations. G: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 




Bribes paid: Document or permit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS OLS Probit Ordered Probit Informal schooling 0,053*** 0,064*** 0,066*** 0,044*** -0,039*** 
 (0,020) (0,023) (0,023) (0,011) (0,010) 
Some primary 0,072*** 0,062*** 0,043* 0,046*** -0,043*** 
 (0,013) (0,015) (0,022) (0,007) (0,008) 
Primary 0,068*** 0,073*** 0,056** 0,050*** -0,045*** 
 (0,013) (0,012) (0,022) (0,009) (0,009) 
Some secondary 0,099*** 0,105*** 0,086*** 0,066*** -0,061*** 
 (0,015) (0,012) (0,020) (0,009) (0,009) 
Secondary 0,133*** 0,136*** 0,150*** 0,088*** -0,081*** 
 (0,023) (0,022) (0,027) (0,011) (0,011) 
Technical 0,186*** 0,217*** 0,199*** 0,110*** -0,101*** 
 (0,033) (0,034) (0,038) (0,012) (0,012) 
Some university 0,216*** 0,251*** 0,236*** 0,106*** -0,110*** 
 (0,049) (0,044) (0,057) (0,020) (0,019) 
University 0,285*** 0,305*** 0,293*** 0,142*** -0,138*** 
 (0,063) (0,060) (0,070) (0,022) (0,020) 
Post-graduate 0,292*** 0,267*** 0,301*** 0,145*** -0,141*** 
 (0,081) (0,077) (0,083) (0,025) (0,026) 
Age -0,001 -0,001* -0,001* -0,001** 0,001** 
 (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) 
Female -0,078*** -0,083*** -0,077*** -0,042*** 0,042*** 
 (0,015) (0,014) (0,016) (0,006) (0,006) 
Part-time 0,038*** 0,053*** 0,059*** 0,026*** -0,021*** 
 (0,014) (0,011) (0,019) (0,008) (0,007) 
Full-time 0,021** 0,029*** 0,038** 0,014** -0,013** 
 (0,009) (0,010) (0,018) (0,006) (0,005) 
Fairly bad -0,073*** -0,039*** -0,056** -0,034*** 0,036*** 
 (0,020) (0,015) (0,024) (0,008) (0,008) 
Neither good nor bad -0,111*** -0,079*** -0,074** -0,047*** 0,052*** 
 (0,027) (0,020) (0,032) (0,009) (0,010) 
Fairly good -0,098*** -0,063*** -0,048* -0,046*** 0,047*** 
 (0,024) (0,016) (0,028) (0,008) (0,009) 
Very good -0,074*** -0,050** -0,033 -0,035*** 0,034*** 
 (0,023) (0,022) (0,031) (0,010) (0,010) 
Secondary sector 0,039**  0,037*** 0,023*** -0,020*** 
 (0,017)  (0,013) (0,008) (0,008) 
Tertiary sector 0,042***  0,035*** 0,022*** -0,022*** 
 (0,009)  (0,009) (0,005) (0,005) 
Inactive -0,005  -0,004 -0,004 0,006 
 (0,012)  (0,013) (0,007) (0,007) 
British -1,691*** 0,192 0,011 0,212*** -0,219*** 
 (0,548) (0,150) (0,097) (0,051) (0,052) 
GDP per capita 0,000** -0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 -0,000* 
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 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Exports 0,002 0,006** -0,000 -0,003 0,001 
 (0,005) (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) 
Democracy 0,032*** 0,035*** 0,007 0,018*** -0,016*** 
 (0,006) (0,011) (0,010) (0,003) (0,003) 
Constant -0,109 0,056 0,277** -1,455***  
 (0,127) (0,087) (0,111) (0,311)  
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0,068 0,065 0,039 0,100 0,072 
Log-likelihood - - - -15 857,23 -22 091,18 
Number of 
observations 40 311 61 590 40 311 40 311 40 311 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within countries. 
Marginal effects are reported for Probit and Ordered Probit models. *Significant at 10 percent; 
**significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent. The reference groups for the dummy variables are: 
no formal schooling, male, unemployed, very bad, primary sector, and French legal system. The 










or permit School 
Household 




schooling 0,053*** 0,002 0,023 0,070* 0,062*** -0,038* 0,018** 
 (0,020) (0,014) (0,020) (0,036) (0,012) (0,022) (0,008) Some 
primary 0,072*** 0,025*** 0,048** 0,053** 0,020* -0,020 0,002 
 (0,013) (0,007) (0,020) (0,026) (0,010) (0,017) (0,007) 
Primary 0,068*** 0,026** 0,043** 0,054** 0,036*** -0,000 0,007* 
 (0,013) (0,013) (0,019) (0,022) (0,012) (0,013) (0,004) Some 
secondary 0,099*** 0,025** 0,063*** 0,059*** 0,061*** -0,011 0,007 
 (0,015) (0,011) (0,020) (0,022) (0,014) (0,020) (0,006) 
Secondary 0,133*** 0,027** 0,073*** 0,097*** 0,097*** -0,017 0,014** 
 (0,023) (0,012) (0,021) (0,031) (0,029) (0,024) (0,007) 
Technical 0,186*** 0,055*** 0,131*** 0,117*** 0,114*** -0,025 0,010 
 (0,033) (0,016) (0,041) (0,022) (0,029) (0,027) (0,010) Some 
university 0,216*** 0,068*** 0,171*** 0,157*** 0,193*** 0,053 -0,003 
 (0,049) (0,025) (0,053) (0,045) (0,042) (0,040) (0,010) 
University 0,285*** 0,083*** 0,191*** 0,169*** 0,203*** -0,029 -0,003 
 (0,063) (0,032) (0,060) (0,041) (0,073) (0,040) (0,011) 
Post-graduate 0,292*** 0,105* 0,227*** 0,087 0,259*** 0,110 0,065 
 (0,081) (0,055) (0,074) (0,068) (0,037) (0,089) (0,051) 
Age -0,001 0,000 0,000 -0,000 -0,001* -0,001*** -0,000*** 
 (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) 
Female -0,078*** -0,015** -0,030*** -0,046*** -0,110*** -0,019 -0,009** 
 (0,015) (0,007) (0,008) (0,013) (0,027) (0,015) (0,004) 
Part-time 0,038*** 0,045*** 0,044*** 0,014 0,044*** 0,031* 0,009 
 (0,014) (0,012) (0,015) (0,020) (0,012) (0,017) (0,007) 
Full-time 0,021** 0,016** 0,026*** 0,006 0,026* -0,002 0,003 
 (0,009) (0,007) (0,008) (0,016) (0,016) (0,019) (0,010) 
Fairly bad -0,073*** -0,037*** -0,033*** -0,015 -0,054** -0,072*** -0,003 
 (0,020) (0,012) (0,011) (0,019) (0,023) (0,028) (0,007) Neither good 
nor bad -0,111*** -0,057*** -0,068*** -0,018 -0,100*** -0,142*** -0,004 
 (0,027) (0,014) (0,018) (0,014) (0,034) (0,041) (0,007) 
Fairly good -0,098*** -0,051*** -0,044*** -0,017 -0,092*** -0,144*** -0,011 
 (0,024) (0,019) (0,014) (0,019) (0,035) (0,036) (0,007) 
Very good -0,074*** -0,012 0,002 -0,015 -0,068* -0,063 -0,019*** 
 (0,023) (0,013) (0,026) (0,025) (0,038) (0,055) (0,007) Secondary 
sector 0,039** 0,017 0,025 -0,001 0,049** 0,006 0,012 
 (0,017) (0,020) (0,020) (0,021) (0,024) (0,022) (0,011) Tertiary 
sector 0,042*** 0,010 0,040*** 0,036*** 0,050*** -0,003 0,012 
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 (0,009) (0,007) (0,010) (0,012) (0,015) (0,014) (0,008) 
Inactive -0,005 0,001 0,019 -0,019 -0,007 -0,019 -0,001 
 (0,012) (0,011) (0,012) (0,012) (0,016) (0,026) (0,005) 
British -1,691*** 0,141*** 0,094** 0,075*** 0,349*** 0,062*** 0,032*** 
 (0,548) (0,025) (0,043) (0,008) (0,033) (0,021) (0,003) GDP per 
capita 0,000** 0,000* 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000** 0,000*** -0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Exports 0,002 0,001 0,005 0,001*** 0,003 -0,007*** -0,001*** 
 (0,005) (0,003) (0,005) (0,000) (0,007) (0,001) (0,000) 
Democracy 0,032*** 0,018*** 0,005 -0,006*** 0,016** -0,006*** 0,001 
 (0,006) (0,004) (0,007) (0,001) (0,008) (0,001) (0,001) 
Constant -0,109 -0,132 -0,194 0,110** -0,275 0,496*** 0,048*** 
 (0,127) (0,102) (0,160) (0,046) (0,194) (0,049) (0,017) Religion 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0,068 0,058 0,066 0,031 0,088 0,077 0,010 
Number of 
observations 40 311 40 642 38 842 20 285 40 229 19 857 21 095 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within countries. 
*Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent. The reference groups for the 
dummy variables are: no formal schooling, male, unemployed, very bad, primary sector, and French legal 







 Document or permit School Border Police Health 
Perception_Gov 0,045***     
 (0,012)     
Perception_School  0,069***    
  (0,011)    
Perception_Border   0,057***   
   (0,013)   
Perception_Police    0,097***  
    (0,015)  
Perception_Health     0,175*** 
     (0,036) 
Informal schooling 0,058* -0,009 0,085* 0,053*** -0,051** 
 (0,030) (0,016) (0,048) (0,016) (0,023) 
Some primary 0,080*** 0,016 0,059 0,011 -0,035** 
 (0,016) (0,010) (0,036) (0,014) (0,017) 
Primary 0,081*** 0,014 0,043 0,024* -0,027* 
 (0,020) (0,012) (0,030) (0,012) (0,016) 
Some secondary 0,106*** 0,008 0,045 0,045*** -0,038* 
 (0,018) (0,012) (0,031) (0,017) (0,022) 
Secondary 0,157*** 0,010 0,084*** 0,075** -0,044* 
 (0,023) (0,012) (0,031) (0,030) (0,026) 
Technical 0,160*** 0,039*** 0,104*** 0,090*** -0,066** 
 (0,029) (0,015) (0,026) (0,032) (0,032) 
Some university 0,225*** 0,044* 0,144*** 0,173*** 0,012 
 (0,046) (0,026) (0,051) (0,041) (0,046) 
University 0,249*** 0,066** 0,139*** 0,170** -0,060 
 (0,053) (0,032) (0,037) (0,072) (0,041) 
Post-graduate 0,336*** 0,090 0,060 0,234*** 0,080 
 (0,128) (0,060) (0,065) (0,039) (0,094) 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,000 -0,001 -0,001** 
 (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) 
Female -0,067*** -0,016** -0,042*** -0,109*** -0,011 
 (0,017) (0,008) (0,014) (0,026) (0,014) 
Part-time 0,057*** 0,046*** 0,013 0,048*** 0,035* 
 (0,017) (0,013) (0,025) (0,013) (0,018) 
Full-time 0,036** 0,017** -0,003 0,024 0,001 
 (0,016) (0,009) (0,021) (0,016) (0,020) 
Fairly bad -0,043** -0,037*** -0,011 -0,048** -0,064** 
 (0,021) (0,012) (0,023) (0,023) (0,026) 
Neither good nor bad -0,073*** -0,058*** -0,021 -0,095*** -0,127*** 
 (0,027) (0,015) (0,015) (0,035) (0,037) 
Fairly good -0,058** -0,051*** -0,014 -0,075** -0,122*** 
 (0,025) (0,019) (0,023) (0,033) (0,031) 
Very good -0,044* -0,013 -0,003 -0,049 -0,029 
 (0,024) (0,009) (0,031) (0,040) (0,054) 
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Secondary sector 0,065*** 0,015 0,003 0,047* -0,021 
 (0,021) (0,022) (0,025) (0,026) (0,025) 
Tertiary sector 0,056*** 0,008 0,043*** 0,046*** -0,024 
 (0,012) (0,009) (0,014) (0,014) (0,015) 
Inactive -0,000 -0,000 -0,027** -0,014 -0,028 
 (0,016) (0,013) (0,013) (0,018) (0,029) 
British -0,194*** -0,630 0,078*** -2,083* 0,072*** 
 (0,010) (0,416) (0,009) (1,196) (0,022) 
GDP per capita -0,000** 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000* 0,000* 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Exports 0,004*** 0,001 0,001** 0,006 -0,005*** 
 (0,001) (0,004) (0,000) (0,007) (0,001) 
Democracy -0,032*** 0,022*** -0,006*** 0,019** -0,009*** 
 (0,001) (0,005) (0,001) (0,008) (0,001) 
Constant 0,199*** -0,205 0,072 -0,590*** 0,283*** 
 (0,044) (0,131) (0,058) (0,224) (0,058) 
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0,070 0,067 0,037 0,096 0,118 
Number of 
observations 19 291 35 022 16 105 35 614 17 164 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within countries. 
*Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent. The reference groups for 
the dummy variables are: no formal schooling, male, unemployed, very bad, primary sector, and French 






Perceived corruption among government officials 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Ordered Probit 
Informal 
schooling -0,033 -0,033 0,025 -0,030 0,009 0,007 
 (0,039) (0,039) (0,022) (0,031) (0,014) (0,010) 
Some primary 0,016 0,016 0,026 -0,037 0,005 -0,004 
 (0,028) (0,028) (0,024) (0,035) (0,010) (0,007) 
Primary 0,047 0,047 0,050 -0,054 0,024** -0,012 
 (0,037) (0,037) (0,031) (0,050) (0,012) (0,009) 
Some secondary 0,093*** 0,093*** 0,113*** 0,031 0,045*** -0,025*** 
 (0,034) (0,034) (0,027) (0,033) (0,014) (0,009) 
Secondary 0,162*** 0,162*** 0,176*** 0,138*** 0,069*** -0,042*** 
 (0,040) (0,040) (0,032) (0,035) (0,019) (0,011) 
Technical 0,151*** 0,151*** 0,178*** 0,117*** 0,082*** -0,040*** 
 (0,045) (0,045) (0,039) (0,043) (0,024) (0,012) 
Some university 0,180** 0,180** 0,261*** 0,193*** 0,071** -0,047** 
 (0,089) (0,089) (0,051) (0,066) (0,033) (0,023) 
University 0,214*** 0,214*** 0,251*** 0,219*** 0,141*** -0,057*** 
 (0,042) (0,042) (0,036) (0,055) (0,025) (0,011) 
Post-graduate 0,306*** 0,306*** 0,284*** 0,280*** 0,109*** -0,078*** 
 (0,087) (0,087) (0,082) (0,079) (0,029) (0,022) 
Age -0,001* -0,001* -0,001** -0,002*** -0,000 0,000* 
 (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) 
Female -0,039** -0,039** -0,033*** -0,038** -0,008* 0,010** 
 (0,017) (0,017) (0,011) (0,018) (0,004) (0,004) 
Part-time -0,010 -0,010 0,005 -0,040 -0,005 0,003 
 (0,020) (0,020) (0,014) (0,031) (0,009) (0,005) 
Full-time 0,018 0,018 0,016 -0,001 -0,002 -0,004 
 (0,023) (0,023) (0,015) (0,032) (0,007) (0,006) 
Fairly bad -0,119*** -0,119*** -0,097*** -0,126*** 0,008 0,028*** 
 (0,029) (0,029) (0,016) (0,025) (0,009) (0,007) Neither good nor 
bad -0,108*** -0,108*** -0,100*** -0,165*** 0,015 0,025** 
 (0,040) (0,040) (0,022) (0,038) (0,011) (0,010) 
Fairly good -0,216*** -0,216*** -0,200*** -0,226*** -0,028*** 0,053*** 
 (0,047) (0,047) (0,025) (0,044) (0,011) (0,011) 
Very good -0,236*** -0,236*** -0,218*** -0,243*** -0,052*** 0,059*** 
 (0,064) (0,064) (0,042) (0,051) (0,015) (0,015) 
Secondary sector 0,074** 0,074**  0,099*** 0,043*** -0,020** 
 (0,030) (0,030)  (0,031) (0,015) (0,007) 
Tertiary sector 0,044*** 0,044***  0,050*** 0,019*** -0,011*** 
 (0,016) (0,016)  (0,017) (0,006) (0,004) 
Inactive 0,013 0,013  -0,002 0,005 -0,003 
 (0,027) (0,027)  (0,034) (0,010) (0,007) 
British 0,079*** 0,271*** -1,280 0,106 -0,122*** 0,154*** 





GDP per capita 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000 -0,000 0,001*** -0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Exports 0,013*** 0,003*** 0,006 0,002 0,022*** -0,015*** 
 (0,001) (0,000) (0,006) (0,004) (0,001) (0,001) 
Democracy -0,053*** -0,029*** -0,025 -0,025*** -0,080*** 0,061*** 
 (0,002) (0,001) (0,031) (0,008) (0,003) (0,003) 
Nation corruption  -0,333***     
  (0,024)     
Constant 0,908*** 1,021*** 1,425*** 1,454*** -6,158***  
 (0,089) (0,078) (0,195) (0,147) (0,299)  Religion 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0,092 0,092 0,080 0,050 0,083 0,042 
Log-likelihood     -6 257,840 -22 144,508 Number of 
observations 19 453 19 453 42 337 19 453 19 453 19 453 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within countries. Marginal 
effects are reported for Probit and Ordered Probit models. *Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; 
***significant at 1 percent. The reference groups for the dummy variables are: no formal schooling, male, 
unemployed, very bad, primary sector, and French legal system.  The coefficients on the variable religion are 





 Government officials School Border Police Health 
Informal schooling -0,033 0,048** -0,029 -0,027 -0,034 
 (0,039) (0,022) (0,043) (0,023) (0,028) 
Some primary 0,016 0,051*** 0,087*** 0,030* -0,013 
 (0,028) (0,019) (0,026) (0,018) (0,031) 
Primary 0,047 0,044** 0,061 0,033 0,008 
 (0,037) (0,021) (0,038) (0,022) (0,029) 
Some secondary 0,093*** 0,092*** 0,137*** 0,095*** 0,031 
 (0,034) (0,022) (0,040) (0,034) (0,033) 
Secondary 0,162*** 0,131*** 0,191*** 0,144*** 0,064 
 (0,040) (0,042) (0,041) (0,037) (0,044) 
Technical 0,151*** 0,144*** 0,192*** 0,152*** 0,113*** 
 (0,045) (0,037) (0,049) (0,052) (0,032) 
Some university 0,180** 0,228*** 0,255*** 0,181*** 0,170*** 
 (0,089) (0,059) (0,089) (0,062) (0,056) 
University 0,214*** 0,156*** 0,313*** 0,195*** 0,081 
 (0,042) (0,052) (0,060) (0,046) (0,054) 
Post-graduate 0,306*** 0,187*** 0,206*** 0,225*** 0,146* 
 (0,087) (0,054) (0,080) (0,064) (0,079) 
Age -0,001* -0,001*** 0,000 -0,002*** -0,001 
 (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) 
Female -0,039** -0,018** -0,043** -0,051*** -0,015 
 (0,017) (0,008) (0,018) (0,010) (0,012) 
Part-time -0,010 0,032 0,011 0,005 0,029 
 (0,020) (0,019) (0,022) (0,022) (0,028) 
Full-time 0,018 -0,007 0,043* 0,003 -0,002 
 (0,023) (0,020) (0,026) (0,025) (0,026) 
Fairly bad -0,119*** -0,052*** -0,115*** -0,115*** -0,055** 
 (0,029) (0,019) (0,024) (0,028) (0,025) 
Neither good nor bad -0,108*** -0,075*** -0,078** -0,141*** -0,145*** 
 (0,040) (0,027) (0,039) (0,038) (0,037) 
Fairly good -0,216*** -0,068** -0,209*** -0,208*** -0,158*** 
 (0,047) (0,027) (0,032) (0,039) (0,036) 
Very good -0,236*** -0,051* -0,270*** -0,250*** -0,194*** 
 (0,064) (0,027) (0,057) (0,040) (0,040) 
Secondary sector 0,074** 0,068*** 0,102*** 0,079*** 0,090*** 
 (0,030) (0,020) (0,036) (0,023) (0,024) 
Tertiary sector 0,044*** 0,051*** 0,061*** 0,059*** 0,083*** 
 (0,016) (0,014) (0,020) (0,013) (0,015) 
Inactive 0,013 0,068*** 0,041* 0,030* 0,045* 
 (0,027) (0,019) (0,022) (0,016) (0,025) 
British 0,079*** -1,866** 0,134*** -0,653*** 0,046*** 
 (0,012) (0,794) (0,015) (0,076) (0,014) 
GDP per capita 0,000*** 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 0,000** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
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Exports 0,013*** 0,022*** -0,017*** 0,002 -0,015*** 
 (0,001) (0,007) (0,001) (0,010) (0,000) 
Democracy -0,053*** -0,037*** 0,023*** -0,046*** 0,016*** 
 (0,002) (0,013) (0,004) (0,015) (0,002) 
Constant 0,908*** 0,601*** 2,060*** 2,144*** 1,353*** 
 (0,089) (0,171) (0,104) (0,395) (0,058) 
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0,092 0,079 0,100 0,118 0,050 
Number of observations 19 453 40 638 17 199 41 666 20 957 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within countries. 
*Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent. The reference groups 
for the dummy variables are: no formal schooling, male, unemployed, very bad, primary sector, and 







Justifiability of corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS Probit Ordered Probit 
Primary -0,096*** -0,127*** -0,008** 0,029*** 
 (0,037) (0,042) (0,004) (0,006) 
Incomplete techincal -0,074 -0,176** -0,006 0,024** 
 (0,051) (0,075) (0,005) (0,010) 
Technical -0,210*** -0,229*** -0,020*** 0,052*** 
 (0,060) (0,068) (0,005) (0,010) 
Incomplete secondary -0,145** -0,134 -0,016** 0,039*** 
 (0,072) (0,095) (0,006) (0,013) 
Secondary -0,218*** -0,192** -0,020*** 0,055*** 
 (0,062) (0,075) (0,005) (0,010) 
Some university -0,269*** -0,207** -0,024*** 0,066*** 
 (0,080) (0,081) (0,006) (0,014) 
University -0,278*** -0,245** -0,022** 0,058*** 
 (0,087) (0,100) (0,009) (0,014) 
Age -0,007*** -0,007*** -0,000*** 0,002*** 
 (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) 
Female -0,064*** -0,060*** -0,002 0,016*** 
 (0,017) (0,019) (0,002) (0,004) 
Part-time 0,095* 0,103* 0,004 -0,019* 
 (0,050) (0,057) (0,004) (0,010) 
Self-employed -0,042 0,006 0,001 0,010 
 (0,045) (0,055) (0,004) (0,010) 
Retired -0,024 -0,075 -0,011 -0,002 
 (0,050) (0,056) (0,008) (0,012) 
Housewife -0,133*** -0,175*** -0,015*** 0,025*** 
 (0,041) (0,054) (0,005) (0,008) 
Students -0,015 -0,058 -0,003 0,007 
 (0,053) (0,068) (0,005) (0,012) 
Unemployed 0,123** 0,075 0,012*** -0,016 
 (0,052) (0,052) (0,004) (0,011) 
Other -0,125** -0,364*** -0,013 0,040*** 
 (0,055) (0,067) (0,011) (0,014) 
Medium -0,105** -0,119*** -0,011*** 0,019** 
 (0,044) (0,043) (0,004) (0,008) 
High -0,080 -0,070 -0,010 0,019 
 (0,066) (0,074) (0,006) (0,012) 
Secondary sector -0,017 -0,031 -0,001 0,005 
 (0,041) (0,046) (0,004) (0,008) 
Tertiary sector 0,006 -0,039 0,000 -0,002 
 (0,046) (0,072) (0,005) (0,010) 
Inactive 0,088* 0,100** 0,008* -0,013 
 (0,045) (0,050) (0,005) (0,010) 
French -0,378*** 0,068 0,015*** -0,139*** 




Socialist 0,317*** 0,078 0,042*** -0,180*** 
 (0,052) (0,185) (0,006) (0,012) 
Germanic -0,473*** -0,035 -0,011* 0,069*** 
 (0,072) (0,219) (0,006) (0,012) 
GDP per capita 0,000 -0,000 -0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Exports -0,003*** 0,005 -0,002*** 0,011*** 
 (0,000) (0,003) (0,000) (0,001) 
Democracy -0,019*** 0,048*** 0,005*** -0,025*** 
 (0,007) (0,011) (0,001) (0,001) 
Constant 2,376*** 2,913*** -1,143***  
 (0,167) (0,311) (0,132)  
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0,092 0,052 0,111 0,072 
Log-likelihood -72 556,77 -73 390,66 -6 364,13 -31 422,59 
Number of observations 38 561 38 561 38 560 38 561 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within countries.  
Marginal effects are reported for Probit and Ordered Probit models. *Significant at 10 percent; **significant 
at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent. The reference groups for the dummy variables are: incomplete 
primary, male, full-time employed, low income, primary sector and British legal system. The coefficients on 
the variable religion are available upon request from the author. 
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Appendix 2 – Datasets collection description 
 
World Values Survey 
 
SUMMARY: The series is designed to enable a crossnational comparison of values and norms on a 
wide variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. This data 
collection consists of responses from WORLD VALUES SURVEY, 1981-1983 (ICPSR 9309) and 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY, 1981-1984 AND 1990-1993 (ICPSR 6160), along with data 
gathered during 1995-1997. Over 60 surveys representing more than 50 countries participated in the 
1995-1997 study. The 1995 questionnaire retained those items that gave the most significant results 
from the 1981 and 1990 surveys. New topics pertaining to technology, social relationships, and 
parent-child relationships were added. Broad topics covered were work, personal finances, the 
economy, politics, allocation of resources, contemporary social issues, technology and its impact on 
society, and traditional values. Respondents were asked whether the following acts were ever 
justifiable: suicide, cheating on taxes, lying, euthanasia, divorce, and abortion. Respondents were 
also asked about the groups and associations they belonged to, which ones they worked for 
voluntarily, the groups they would not want as neighbors, their general state of health, and whether 
they felt they had free choice and control over their lives. A wide range of items was included on 
the meaning and purpose of life, such as respondents' views on the value of scientific advances, the 
demarcation of good and evil, and religious behavior and beliefs. Respondents were also queried 
about their attitudes toward religion, morality, politics, sexual freedom, marriage, single parenting, 
child-rearing, and the importance of work, family, politics, and religion in their lives. Questions 
relating to work included what financial and social benefits were most important to them in a job, 
the pride they took in their work, if they were happy with their current position, and their views on 
owner/state/employee management of business. Questions pertaining to the stability of the world 
economy, solutions for poverty, and whether respondents were happy with their financial situation 
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were also asked. Respondents' opinions of various forms of political action, the most important 
aims for their countries, confidence in various civil and governmental institutions, and whether they 
would fight in a war for their country were also solicited. Demographic information includes family 
income, number of people residing in the home, size of locality, home ownership, region of 
residence, occupation of the head of household, and the respondent's age, sex, 
occupation, education, religion, religiosity, political party and union membership, and left-right 
political self-placement. 
UNIVERSE: Adults 18 and over in the mass publics of 60 societies representing more than 50 
different countries around the world. 
SAMPLING: Both national random and quota sampling were used. The populations of India, 
China, and Nigeria, as well as rural areas and the illiterate population, were undersampled. 
NOTE: (1) In the data for 1981-1984 and 1990-1993, the wild codes were changed to 
undocumented codes. (2) The title of the series was changed by the principal investigators with the 
addition of the 1995-1997 data. (3) The codebook is provided as an Portable Document Format 
(PDF) file. The PDF file format was developed by Adobe Systems Incorporated and can be 
accessed using PDF reader software, such as the Adobe Acrobat Reader. Information on how to 
obtain a copy of the Acrobat Reader is provided through the ICPSR Website on the Internet. 
EXTENT OF COLLECTION: 1 data file + machine-readable documentation (PDF) + SAS data 
definition statements + SPSS data definition statements 
EXTENT OF PROCESSING: MDATA.PR/ DDEF.ICPSR/ REFORM.DATA/ REFORM.DOC/ 
UNDOCCHK.ICPSR 
DATA FORMAT: Logical Record Length with SAS and SPSS data definition statements 
File Structure: rectangular 
Cases: 168,482 
Variables: 251 
Record Length: 352 
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Records Per Case: 1 
Ronald Inglehart et al.  WORLD VALUES SURVEYS AND EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEYS, 1981-





The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public attitude surveys, covering up to 20 African 
countries in Round 4 (2008). Based on representative national samples, the surveys assess citizen 
attitudes to democracy, markets, and civil society, among other topics. 
Together with National Partners in each country, the Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Center for Democratic Development 
(CDDGhana), and the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP), with 
additional technical support provided by Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of 
Cape Town (UCT). (…) 
Approach to Data Collection 
Although other research methods were used during the project design,1 the Afrobarometer relies on 
personal interviews to obtain information from individual Respondents. The same questionnaire, 
which contains identical or functionally equivalent items, is applied to every Respondent in each 
country. Because questions are standardized, responses can be compared across countries and over 
time. In the personal interview, the Interviewer goes to a randomly selected household and 
interviews a randomly selected individual from that household. The Interviewer asks this 
Respondent a series of questions in a face-to-face situation and in a language of the Respondent’s 
choice. The Interviewer records the responses (i.e., the answers) provided by the Respondent. 
Advantages of this approach are that the survey response rate is usually high; the Respondents have 
the opportunity to clarify their answers; and, by aggregating responses, we are able to make 
inferences about public opinion. On this last point, it should be noted that Afrobarometer surveys 
are based on national probability samples. As a consequence, the aggregated results are 
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representative of larger groups. At the national level, Afrobarometer sample sizes are large enough 
to make inferences about all voting age citizens with an average margin of sampling error of no 
more than plus or minus 2.8 percent at a 95 percent confidence level (with a sample size of 1200). 
By the same token, it should be noted that Afrobarometer results cannot be generalized to Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. Because it is possible to conduct survey research on public opinion only 
in countries that have undergone a measure of political liberalization, the sample of countries does 
not include authoritarian regimes or countries embroiled in civil wars. In an effort to be more 
representative, however, we will now cover at least five francophone countries and two lusophone 
countries. 
 
Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Manual, compiled by the Afrobarometer Network, February 2007 
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Appendix 3 – Recoded variables 
 
The following presents the recoding assumptions to form the variable occupation and religion in the 
Afrobarometer dataset and the World Values Survey dataset. 
 
 
Afrobarometer occupation New occupation category  
Agent of NGO        Tertiary 
Anything          Anything/other 
Apprentice          Secondary 
Armed Services/Police/ Security Personnel      Tertiary 
Artisan/skilled manual worker formal sector     Secondary 
Artisan/skilled manual worker informal sector    Secondary 
Artisan/Skilled manual worker: not sure formal or informal Secondary 
Artisan/skilled, formal sector      Secondary 
Artisan/skilled, informal sector      Secondary 
Business person          Tertiary 
Business person (own business, 10 or more)   Tertiary 
Business person (own business, less than 10)   Tertiary 
Business person (works for others)      Tertiary 
Catering/cook/chef          Tertiary 
Clergy/Imam/Pastor        Tertiary 
Clergyman/priest/paster          Tertiary 
Clerical Worker        Tertiary 
Commercial farmer (mainly for sale)    Primary 
Disabled         Inactive 
Domestic worker/ maid      Tertiary 
Domestic Worker/Maid/Char/Househelp        Tertiary 
Don't know          Don't know 
Driver         Tertiary 
Eleveur/cattle breeder        Primary 
Employee at NGO       Tertiary 
Farm worker        Primary 
Farmer (produces mainly for sale)     Primary 
Farmer (produces only for home consumption)     Primary 
Farmer (produces surplus for sale)     Primary 
Fisherman        Primary 
Government worker       Tertiary 
Herdboy        Primary 
Housewife/ work in household      Inactive 
Local leader/chief/headman        Tertiary 
Marine/sailor         Tertiary 
Miner         Primary 
Missing         Missing 
Motor cyclist/okada man        Tertiary 
Musician        Tertiary 
Never had a job       Inactive 
Other          Anything/other 
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Pastoralist        Tertiary 
Pastoralist/herder/raise livestock       Primary 
Peasant farmer (own consumption and sale)    Primary 
Police/ Security/ Military       Tertiary 
Politician        Tertiary 
Priest        Tertiary 
Professional worker       Tertiary 
Professional Worker (e.g., lawyer, accountant, nurse, etc.)   Tertiary 
Refused         Refused 
Religious leader         Tertiary 
Retail worker       Tertiary 
Retired          Inactive 
Sells home made beer     Tertiary 
Skilled textile factory worker       Secondary 
Student        Inactive 
Subsistence farmer (own consumption only)     Primary 
Supervisor/Foreman         Tertiary 
Teacher         Tertiary 
Trader/Hawker/Vendor        Tertiary 
Traditional Healer       Tertiary 
Unemployed        Inactive 
Unskilled manual in the formal sector     Primary 
Unskilled manual worker in the informal sector   Primary 
Unskilled manual worker: not sure formal or informal Primary 
Unskilled manual, formal sector     Primary 
Unskilled manual, informal sector      Primary 
Unskilled textile factory worker       Primary 
Youth corper/national service        Tertiary 
 
 
World Values Survey occupation New occupation category 
Agricultural worker Primary 
Employer/manager of establishment w. less than 100 employed Tertiary 
Employer/manager of establishment w. less than 500 employed Tertiary 
Employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employed Tertiary 
Employer/manager of establishment with 100 or more employed Tertiary 
Employer/manager of establishment with 500 or more employed Tertiary 
Employer/manager of establishment with less than 10 employed Tertiary 
Farmer: has own farm Primary 
Foreman and supervisor Tertiary 
Junior level non manual Tertiary 
Member of armed forces Tertiary 
Middle level non-manual office worker Tertiary 
Never had a job Inactive 
Non manual -office worker Tertiary 
Other Anything/other 
Professional worker Tertiary 
Semi-skilled manual worker Secondary 
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Skilled manual Secondary 
Supervisory non manual -office worker Tertiary 
Unskilled manual Primary 
 
 
Afrobarometer religion New religion 
African Abraham         Other 
African Independent Church       Christian - other 
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God)  Agnostic 
AME         Christian - protestant 
Anglican         Christian - other 
Apostolic         Other 
Apostolic Faith/New_United         Other 
Assembly of God       Christian - other 
Atheist (Do not believe in a God)    Atheist 
Bahai         Other 
Baptist         Christian - other 
Brotherhood Olumba Olumba       Christian - other 
Calviniste (FJKM)         Christian - protestant 
Catholic          Christian - catholic 
Christian (general)        Christian - other 
Christian (general/other)        Christian - other 
Christian only        Christian - other 
Church of Christ        Christian - other 
Confrarie de la Hamadiya (Hamalite)     Muslim 
Confrarie de la Trabiya      Muslim 
Confrarie de la Wahhabiya (Wahhabite)     Muslim 
Confrarie des Laynes(brotherhood)        Muslim 
Coptic         Other 
Don't know        Don't know 
Dutch Church        Dutch reformed church 
Dutch Reform        Dutch reformed church 
Dutch Reform/NG        Dutch reformed church 
Dutch Reformed         Dutch reformed church 
Dutch Reformed (e.g. NGK,NHK,GK,Mission,APK,URC)      Dutch reformed church 
Evangelical          Christian - protestant 
Hindu          Hindu 
Igreja Jesus Cristo dos ultima dias     Christian - protestant 
Igreja Universal so Reino de Deus    Christian - other 
Independent         Other 
IPCC         Christian - other 
Islam         Muslim 
Ismaeli          Other 
Ismaili Muslim (Shi'a)       Muslim 
Ithnashiri Muslim (Shi'a)       Muslim 
Izala         Other 
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Jehovah's Witness        Jehovah's Witness 
Jesosy Mamonjy        Other 
Khodja Muslim (Shi'a)       Muslim 
Last Church/Reform        Other 
Lutheran          Christian - other 
Memon Muslim (Shi'a)       Muslim 
Mennonite         Christian - protestant 
Methodist         Christian - protestant 
Missing          Missing 
Mormon          Christian - protestant 
Mouridiya Brotherhood         Muslim 
Muslim (general)        Muslim 
Muslim (general/other)        Muslim 
Muslim General        Muslim 
Muslim khadre        Muslim 
Muslim Layne        Muslim 
Muslim Mouride        Muslim 
Muslim only         Muslim 
Muslim Tijane        Muslim 
Muslim, Shiite        Muslim 
Muslim, Sunni        Muslim 
Neo traditional religion (Munigiki, Tent of Living God)   Traditional 
None          None 
Nova Apostolica        Christian - protestant 
Orthodox         Christian - other 
Other         Other 
Other Christian (Moravian)        Christian - protestant 
Other Churches        Other 
Other Muslim        Muslim 
Pentecostal         Christian - other 
Presbyterian         Christian - protestant 
Protestant         Christian - protestant 
Protestant (Evangelical/Pentecostal)        Christian - protestant 
Protestant (Mainstream)        Christian - protestant 
protestant flm        Christian - protestant 
Qadiriya Brotherhood         Muslim 
Quaker          Christian - other 
Quaker/Friends         Christian - other 
Racionalism Cristo        Christian - other 
Racionalismo Cristao/Christian Rationalism        Christian - other 
Reformed Church in Zimbabwe      Dutch reformed church 
Refused         Refused 
Roman Catholic        Christian - catholic 
Salvation Army        Christian - other 
Seventh Day Adventist       Christian - protestant 
Seventh Day Adventist/Mormon        Christian - protestant 
Shia only         Muslim 
Sidya         Other 
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St. John        Other 
Sukuti         Other 
Sunni Muslim        Muslim 
Sunni only         Muslim 
Tijaniya Brotherhood         Muslim 
Traditional religion        Traditional 
Traditional/ethnic religion         Traditional 
UCCSA         Christian - protestant 
Universal Church        Other 
VGK         Christian - protestant 
ZCC         Christian - other 
Zion         Christian - other 
Zionist Christian Church       Christian - other 
 
World Values Survey religion New religion 
Missing Missing 
Not asked in survey Missing 
Not applicable Missing 
No answer Missing 
Don’t know Missing 
aglipayan Christian - protestant 
Al-hadis Muslim 
Alliance Other 
Ancestral worshipping Other 
Anglican Christian - other 
Armenian apostolic church Christian - other 
Assembly of god Christian - other 
Baha’i Other 
Baptist Christian - other 
Born again Christian - other 
brgy. sang birhen Christian - other 
Buddhist Buddhist 
C & s celestial Christian - other 
Cao dai Other 
Catholic: doesn¥t follow rules Christian - catholic 
Charismatic Christian - other 
Christian Christian - other 
Christian fellowship Christian - other 
Christian reform Christian - protestant 
Church of christ / church of christ / church of christ of latter-day 
saints Christian - protestant 
Confucianism Other 
Druse Muslim 
El shaddai Christian - other 
Essid Other 
Evangelical Christian - protestant 
Faith in god Other 
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Filipinista Christian - protestant 
Free church/non denominational church Christian - protestant 
Greek catholic Christian - catholic 
Gregorian Christian - other 
Hindu Hindu 
Hoa hao Buddhist 
Hussite Christian - other 
Iglesia ni cristo (inc) Christian - other 
Independent african church (e.g. zcc, shembe, etc.) Christian - other 
Independent church Other 
Israelita nuevo pacto universal (frepap) Christian - other 
Jain Other 
Jehovah witnesses Jehovah's Witness 
Jesus is lord (jil) Christian - other 
Jesus miracle crusade Christian - other 
Jew Other 
Ka-a elica Other 
Lutheran Christian - other 
Mennonite Christian - protestant 
Methodists Christian - protestant 
Mita Christian - other 
Mormon Christian - protestant 
Muslim Muslim 
Native Traditional 
New testament christ/biblist Christian - other 
Orthodox Christian - other 
Other Other 
Other: brasil: espirit,candomblÈ,umbanda,esoterism,occultism Other 
Other: christian com Other 
Other: oriental Other 
Other: philippines (less 0.5%) Other 
Other: taiwan (taoism, protestant fundam., ancient cults) Other 
Paganism Other 
Pentecostal Christian - other 
Presbyterian Christian - protestant 
Protestant Christian - protestant 
Qadiani Muslim 
Roman catholic Christian - catholic 
Rosacruz Other 
Salvation army Christian - other 
Self lealisation fellowship Other 
Seven day adventist Christian - protestant 










The church of sweden Christian - other 




United church of christ in the philippines (uccp) Christian - other 
Wicca Other 
Zionist Christian - other 
Zoroastrian Other 
Ratana Other 
Ringatu Christian - other 
New apostolic church Christian - other 
Yiguan dao Other 
Daolism Other 
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